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Abstract 
This is the third paper in a series of four essays that deal with recent 
developments affecting the political economy of armaments. It begins by 
identifying the 'military bias paradox' of divergent behaviour, whereby the 
large armament corporations experienced an almost uninterrupted growth since 
the peak of the Vietnam War while domestic military spending exhibited a 
decade-long decline. The resolution of this apparent paradox could be found 
in the emerging institution of arms exports, which supplemented domestic 
military budgets. The expansion of world markets for weapons coincided with 
the oil crisis of the 1970s. The Middle East became the focus of these 
developments. The interaction during the 1970s of rising military exports to 
this area and growing oil exports from the region provided a basis for 
cooperation between major armament and energy corporations in an 
'Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition'. The consolidation of this coalition 
removed a major conflict between 'civilian' and 'military' producers in the 
United States and affected the course of U.S. domestic and foreign military 
policies. 
Resume 
Ceci est le troisieme d'une serie de quatre articles sur les recents 
developements affectant l'economie politique des armements. L'article 
commence par identifier le 'paradoxe de la tendance militaire', selon lequel 
les grandes corporations d'armes ont connu une croissance presque 
ininterrompue depuis le summwn de la guerre au Vietnam, alors que les 
depenses militaires domestiques etaient en declin depuis une decade. 
L'explication de ce paradoxe apparent pourrait se trouver dans l'emergence 
des exportations d'armes, qui suppleaient aux budgets militaires 
domestiques. L'expansion des marches mondiaux en matiere d'armes coincidait 
avec la crise du petrole des annees 70. Le Moyen-Orient devint le point 
central de ces d4velopements. Durant les annees 70, l'interaction entre les 
exportations militaires vers cette region et les exportations de petrole de 
cette region, a fourni une base de cooperation entre les principales 
corporations d'armes et d'energie dans une 'Coaliton Armadollar- 
Petrodollar'. La consolidation de cette coalition a supprime un conflit 
majeur entre les producteurs 'civils' et 'militaires' aux Etats Unis, et 
affecte le cours des politiques militaires, domestiques et 6trangBres. 
1. Introduction: The 'Military Bias Paradox' 
After the Vietnam conflict escalated in the late 1960s, the world wide 
influence of many large U.S.-based corporations on civilian markets 
substantially declined from previous levels. These corporations moved the 
focus of their activities toward the shelter of military markets that were 
somewhat protected from foreign competition. A few of them constituted part 
of the growing 'Armament Corer, which we describe in Nitzan, Rowley and 
Bichler (1989), while others took less prominent positions in U.S. Defense 
contracting. Paradoxically, however, this shift or 'military bias' in the 
big economy of the United States intensified while domestic military budgets 
exhibited a steady long-run decline. Whether expressed in terms of constant 
dollars or as a share of the U.S. gross national product, expenditures on 
armaments fell from the peak of spending on the Vietnam conflict in the late 
1960s to the beginning of the 'largest defense buildup in historyr a decade 
later.' This puzzling period is clearly illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 where 
we contrast the evolution of military spending and the performance of the 
large armament contractors over the two decades between 1966 and 1986. In 
Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler (1989), we identify the 'Armament Niner as a 
group of U.S. corporations who have persistently been among the top ten 
recipients of prime Defense contracts on an annual basis. The figures show 
how the net income obtained by the Armament Nine rose during this period of 
general decline in military spending - -  both as a share of the aggregate net 
income earned by all Fortune-500 corporations (Figure 1) and when expressed 
in terms of constant dollars (Figure 2). 
Figure 1 
THE 'MILITARY BIAS PARADOX': 
DOMESTIC MILITARY SPENDING~ AS A SHARE OF GNP AND 
THE SHARE OF THE ARMAMENT NINE IN NET PROFITS OF ALL FORTUNE-500 CORPORATIONS 
(percent) 
SOURCE: Military spending is calculated from Citibase, Citibank Economic 
Database [Machine-Readable Magnetic Data File, 19861 (New York: 
Citibank, N.A. 1978), p. X-3-3, Table 3.7b, series GGFEN and 
GGFNC; GNP data are from Citibase, p. X-1-1, Table 1.1, series 
GNP; Net profits of the Armament Nine are from Standard & Poor's 
Compustat Senrices (1986) Industrial Compustat, Compustat II/130- 
Item Annual Magnetic Tape (for 1966-1985); 'The Fortune 500', 
Fortune, April 27, 1987 (for 1986-1987); Net profits of Fortune- 
500 corporations are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, various years. 
a Excluding compensation of employees. 
Figure 2 
THE 'MILITARY BIAS PARADOX': 
DOMESTIC MILITARY SPENDING~ AND NET PROFITS OF THE ARMAMENT NINE 
($  b i l l i o n ,  1982 pricesb) 
Year 
SOURCE: For mil i tary spending and net  p ro f i t s  of the Armament Nine, see 
Figure 1 ;  GNP def la tor  data are  from Citibase,  p.  X - 1 - 1 ,  Table 
7 . 4 ,  se r ies  GD. 
a Excluding compensation of employees 
Deflated by the GNP def la tor  with 1982 as base year. 
One potential explanation for the occurrence of these disparate 
changes, affecting the relative performance of the Armament Nine, involves 
major compositional shifts among recipients of Defense contracts. Perhaps, 
for example, the share of contracts awarded to the large corporations 
increased disproportionately. This particular explanation seems 
inappropriate on the basis of available evidence since, as revealed by 
Figure 3, the prime contract awards of the Armament Nine and those of the 
Pentagon top-100 contractors were closely synchronized throughout the last 
two decades. Both experienced the stagnation that occurred during the period 
from 1967 to 1976. Furthermore, the value of prime Defense contracts awarded 
to the Armament Nine also declined relative to the value of overall sales by 
these corporations in this period. The historical evolution of the ratio of 
awards to sales is shown in Figure 4 and the decline in the rate is quite 
pronounced. * In addition to this development, we cannot detect any 
compensatory adjustment whereby the profitability associated with Defense 
contracts rose significantly as the size or number of orders fell. The 
correct explanation for the divergent behaviour of U.S. military spending 
and the performance of the Armament Nine ('the military bias paradox') lies 
elsewhere - -  specifically, we suggest, in developments that affected the 
magnitude of arms exports from the United States. 
PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS RECEIVED BY 
THE PENTAGON'S TOP-100 CONTRACTORS AND BY THE ARMAMENT NINE 
($  billion, 1982 pricesa) 
SOURCE: Prime contract award data are from U.S. Department of Defense, 
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operation and Reports 100 Companies Receiving The Largest Dollar 
Vol m e  o f  Prime Contract Awards (Washington, D . C . : Government 
Printing Office), fiscal years 1966-1986; For GNP deflator, see 
Figure 2. 
a Deflated by the GNP deflator with 1982 as base year. 
Figure 4 
THE ARMAMENT NINE: 
RATIO OF DOD P R I M  CONTRACT AWARDS TO TOTAL SALES REVENUES 
(percent) 
SOURCE: For prime contract award data, see Figure 3; Sales revenues are 
from Standard & PoorPs Compustat Services (1986) Industrial 
Compustat, Compustat II/130-Item Annual Magnetic Tape (for 1966- 
1985); 'The Fortune 500', Fortune, April 27, 1987 (for 1986-1987) 
2. Exporting Institutional Waste 
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provides some relevant 
information with which we can explore the role of export sales for 
armaments. As indicated by the criticisms of Kolodziej (1979) and Brzosko 
(1982), the accuracy of this information may be questioned but the 
temptation to use a continuous time series for nominal arms transfers is 
difficult to resist. The agency (ACDA, 1985, pp. 142-3) defines these 
transfers in the following way: 
International transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter or 
cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as 
'conventional,' including weapons of war, parts thereof, 
munition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for 
military use . . .  Dual use equipment, which can have application in 
both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary 
mission is identified as military . . .  The building of defense 
production facilities and licensing fees paid as royalties for the 
production of military equipment are included when they are 
contained in military transfer agreements. 3 
On the assumption that the data provided by this source are flawed but 
remain adequate for the determination of overall trends, the two lines in 
Figure 5 permit us to compare the historical evolution of domestic military 
spending within the United States (excluding compensation of employees) and 
the contemporaneous evolution of arms exports. 
While the value of domestic military spending in the United States fell 
during the decade following the late 1960s, the value of military exports 
soared to new heights until the early 1970s and subsequently fluctuated 
around a higher mean. The size of military exports was clearly much lower 
than the size of domestic military procurement but, for the Armament Core as 
a whole, the significance of these exports far outstripped what their 
- 7 - 
SOURCE : 
U.S. DOMESTIC MILITARY SPENDING~ AND ARMS EXPORTS 
( $  billion, 1982 pricesb) 
Year 
For military spending and the GNP deflator, see Figure 2; Arms 
exports data are from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms %ransf ers (Washington, D . C . : 
Government Printing Office), various years. 
a Excluding compensation of employees 
Deflated by the GNP deflator with 1982 as base year. 
relative size might suggest. Two particular aspects should be noted. First, 
the exporting of arms is a highly concentrated activity. The top ten 
contractors usually receive about a third of the prime contracts awarded by 
the U.S. Department of Defense but these contractors account for a much 
larger proportion of military sales to foreigners. Second, arms exports are 
extraordinarily profitable; even by comparison with domestic military sales. 
The prices of those weapons intended for export are frequently set well 
above the prices of their domestic counterparts. Unit production costs for 
the weapons, however, are lower since (1) overhead cost elements (such as 
research and development) are charged to domestic Defense contracts; and (2) 
weapon production is more efficient as companies progress along 'learning 
cunres'. The potential for exports to have a major role in the rise of the 
Armament Core is evident. 4 
Besides the pressure of these economic factors, the role of military 
exports was affected by changes in the overall political climate. Until the 
1960s, acceptance of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' by the U.S. government meant 
the modest provision of support for friendly indigenous forces in peripheral 
regions but such support was limited to economic and military aid at a low 
level. Apart from this minor element, most U. S. -made arms were sold to the 
U.S. military establishment. A different pattern began to emerge in the late 
1960s, when the involvement of the United States escalated in Vietnam and 
the level of arms exports to the Far East substantially increased. 
Concurrently, the United States directly entered the arms market in the 
Middle East. These two developments mark a watershed for the U. S. armament 
industry. A new phase began for the political economy of armaments; one 
which can be characterized by the export of $institutionalized waste' to 
satisfy the imperative of domestic stability in the United States, as well 
as to meet the objectives of an aggressive foreign policy. 5 
2.1 The Era of Arms Exports 
The emergence of an active world wide market for armaments is clearly 
illustrated by the entries of Table 1, which show the historical 
distribution of arms imports (expressed both in nominal U.S. dollars and as 
proportions relative to the world total for imports) during the period that 
extended from 1963 to 1985. While the Far East was the most important area 
of activity until the early 1970s, the primary focus of sales eventually 
shifted to the Middle East and Africa (especially Libya). Important events 
can be identified for four years; namely, 1967, 1973, 1979 and 1985. During 
1966-7, Israel and some Arab states were preparing for the confrontation 
that occurred in 1967. Arms imports of the Middle East region grew to a 
value of $314 million in 1966 and then to $556 million in the following 
year. However, the principal change to be noted here is not found in the 
higher level of activity for the antagonists but rather in the significant 
structural change by which the United States replaced France and the United 
Kingdom as the primary source of new weaponry for Israel. 
Another turning point occurred in 1973. The military involvement of the 
United States in Vietnam ended while the level of domestic spending on 
military products declined in the United States itself. But in that year, 
arms exports to the Middle East almost doubled and the historical era with 
ARMS IMPORTS: 
SELECTED WORLD  REGION^ 
SOURCE : U . S . Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 
various years. 
& 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
8 
a Because of data updates, recorded figures are from the last annual publication 
in which they appear. 
$ million 
World 
3,242 
3,187 
3,815 
4,660 
5,055 
5,370 
5,860 
5,905 
6,405 
10,380 
13,660 
12,270 
13,180 
17,290 
20,270 
24,380 
28,190 
30,260 
37,460 
40,150 
39,800 
41,670 
28,850 
Percent of world total 
East 
Asia 
18 
17 
31 
39 
39 
39 
36 
33 
33 
38 
32 
18 
17 
8 
6 
7 
14 
14 
10 
10 
9 
9 
14 
East 
Asia 
571 
540 
1,117 
1,812 
1,982 
2,070 
2,090 
1,920 
2,110 
3,910 
4,350 
2,260 
2,220 
1,315 
1,290 
1,650 
3,895 
4,325 
3,720 
3,870 
3,725 
3,875 
3,985 
Africa 
3 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
2 
4 
5 
5 
3 
6 
12 
16 
18 
25 
19 
18 
17 
16 
13 
14 
13 
Africa 
113 
165 
182 
227 
140 
135 
145 
265 
290 
490 
470 
770 
1,540 
2,705 
3,570 
5,980 
5,310 
5,435 
6,360 
6,390 
5,170 
5,750 
3,810 
Middle 
East 
378 
257 
285 
314 
556 
635 
820 
1,250 
1,175 
1,995 
3,745 
4,195 
3,950 
5,845 
7,960 
9,040 
9,725 
9,885 
14,600 
16,610 
17,340 
18,060 
9,390 
Middle 
East 
12 
8 
7 
7 
11 
12 
14 
21 
18 
19 
27 
34 
30 
34 
39 
37 
34 
33 
39 
41 
44 
43 
33 
Mid.East 
& Africa 
15 
13 
12 
12 
14 
14 
16 
26 
23 
24 
31 
40 
42 
49 
57 
62 
53 
51 
56 
57 
57 
57 
46 
this area as the prime market for international armament sales was 
initiated. The world level of arms imports reached $6 billion in 1970, with 
only 21 per cent of the total being directed toward the Middle East. Four 
years later, after the 1973 war, the region took 34 per cent of $12 billion, 
the new level of worldwide sales. After a further four years, the proportion 
had grown to 37 per cent of $24 billion, while the share received by Africa 
also rose. 
The next change was ushered in by the Islamic Revolution of Iran that 
occurred in 1979 - -  to be entrenched by the large demands for armaments that 
quickly followed the beginnings of the subsequent war between this country 
and Iraq. During the 1980s, the international trade in armaments grew to an 
annual level of $40 billion, of which over 40 per cent went to the Middle 
East. Finally, in 1985, the trade declined by about 30 per cent to a lower 
annual level of some $29 billion - -  due largely to an easing of sales to the 
Middle East and Africa. A downward trend continued in 1987. 
The U. S .  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency does not provide annual 
disaggregated data for arms imports to the Middle East from major supplying 
countries but some cumulative data are available. The entries of Table 2 
show the levels of arms transfers for three periods (1964-73; 1974-8; and 
1979-83). Three source areas are identified; namely, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and other countries (France, the United Kingdom, Italy, West 
Germany and China). To clarify the 'military bias paradox', the entries for 
the table can be jointly considered with the patterns revealed in Figures 6 
ARMS EXPORTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST 
(cumulative) 
SOURCE : U. S . Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expendi tures 
and Arrms Transfers (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office). 
For 1964-73, data are from the 1975 publication, p. 70. 
For 1974-78, data are from the 1980 publication, p. 160. 
For 1979-83, data are from the 1985 publication, p. 134. 
Period 
1964-73 
1974-78 
1979-83 
r 
a Data for the United States are for fiscal years. Total does not include the re- 
supply effort to Israel following the 1973 War. 
Excluding Italy. 
Total 
Of which 
$ mill. 
9,447 
29,000 
65,355 
% 
100 
100 
100 
From the 
United States 
$ mill. 
3,251a 
13,800 
14,225 
% 
34 
48 
22 
From the 
Soviet Union 
$ mill. 
4,738 
7,500 
20,375 
From France, U.K. 
Italy, W. Germany 
and China 
% 
50 
26 
31 
$ mill. 
557b 
5,465 
19,305 
% 
1 
6 
19 
30 
b 
ARMADOLLARS AND ARMAPROPITS: 
ARMS EXPORTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NET PROFITS OF THE ARMAMENT NINE 
($  b i l l i o n ,  1982 p r i c e s a )  
Armaprof i t s  
Armadol lars  
SOURCE: For  arms e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  Middle E a s t ,  s e e  Tab le  1 ;  For  n e t  p r o f i t s  
o f  t h e  Armament Nine,  s e e  F igu re  1 ;  For  GNP d e f l a t o r ,  s e e  F igu re  
2.  
a D e f l a t e d  by t h e  GNP d e f l a t o r  w i t h  1982 as ba se  y e a r .  
F i g u r e  7 
ARMADOLLARS AND ARMAPROFITS: 
ARMS EXPORTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NET PROFITS OF THE ARMAMENT NINE 
1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 8  
($ b i l l i o n ,  1 9 8 2  p r i c e s a )  
Year 
SOURCE: S e e  F i g u r e  6 
a D e f l a t e d  b y  the GNP d e f l a t o r  w i t h  1 9 8 2  as b a s e  y e a r .  
and 7,  which contras t  t o t a l  arms exports t o  the Middle East with aggregate 
ne t  p r o f i t s  obtained by the Armament Nine. 
Until  about 1970, when the U . S .  corporations were making t h e i r  f i r s t  
s ign i f ican t  sa les  i n  the arms market of the Middle East ,  the Armament Nine 
were preoccupied with the task of meeting the needs of the U. S .  and South 
Vietnamese armies. The Middle East market probably accounted fo r  a very 
modest share of t h e i r  overal l  p ro f i t s  but t h i s  s i t ua t ion  changed i n  the 
ear ly  1970s. Figures 6 and 7 suggest t ha t  aggregate ne t  p r o f i t s  of the 
Armament Nine enjoyed a close relationship with t o t a l  arms exports t o  t h i s  
region throughout the 1971-1978 period, during which the United States  
replaced the Soviet Union as  the Middle East 's  l a rges t  arms supplier and the 
Armament Nine redirected pa r t  of t h e i r  sa les  e f f o r t  from the declining 
domestic market. in to  the Middle East. Subsequent t o  1979, however, t h i s  
re la t ionship weakened as  competition from France, the United Kingdom, West 
Germany, I t a l y  and China depressed p r o f i t  margins on arms sa les .  The region 
remained one of c ruc ia l  i n t e r e s t  fo r  U . S .  arms producers but t h e i r  share of 
the arms market declined and d i r ec t  p ro f i t ab i l i t y  suffered.  On the other 
hand, the domestic mi l i t a ry  budget rapidly rose i n  the United States  a f t e r  a 
long period of decline and again began to  provide the pr incipal  source of 
the Armament Nine's p ro f i t s .  Note t h i s  pat tern of development i s  consistent 
with the view t h a t ,  f o r  the Armament Nine a t  l e a s t ,  the leve l  of domestic 
procurement i n  the United States provided a s table  revenue base - -  despite 
the decline i n  overal l  mil i tary spending - -  while sa les  t o  the Middle East 
market consti tuted the v o l a t i l e  edge of a c t i v i t y ,  one characterized by a 
marked impact on p ro f i t ab i l i t y .  (U. S .  companies a lso exported arms to  other 
world areas but such exports were either quite stable, as in sales to NATO 
countries, or relatively small, as in sales to the Far East and South 
America. ) 
2.2 Global Income Redistribution and Armament Markets 
The potential dependency of key U.S. corporate groups on the arms 
market in the Middle East indicates some fundamental changes that have 
transformed the political economy of armaments. Traditional Marxist and 
institutional views of military spending had emphasized the role of the U.S. 
government in generating profit opportunities through domestic military 
procurement. Much of this literature, however, was written when the U.S. 
economy was relatively closed and when the hegemony of U.S.-based companies 
was still undisputed despite the emergence of multinational competitors. The 
post-1960s decline of U.S. corporations in civilian world markets 
complicated their relations with the U. S. government. On the one hand, the 
dependency of the corporations on that government gradually increased. 
Indeed much of their decline in civilian markets could be attributed to the 
attraction of profitable government business. On the other hand, business 
activity of U.S.-based companies increasingly became international in 
character, while a growing share of their sales and profits came from 
foreign operations. This new level of dependency reduced the potential 
ability of U.S. governments to counteract adverse international setbacks 
that these corporations might experience. Furthermore, in the early 1970s 
after the entanglement in Vietnam, governmental flexibility in using 
domestic military spending for 'economic' purposes was significantly 
reduced. ~ence, for the large U. S . -based corporations, particularly those 
within the Armament Core, the U.S. government became more important for 
their profitable well-being but less potent in safeguarding their economic 
interests . 
Resolution of this new situation was achieved by the expansion of 
markets for arms exports. The institution of foreign military sales enabled 
the U.S. government to maintain part of its traditional role in affecting 
military business. Military exports were often considered vital to national 
security so the U.S. government provided military loans to 'client 
countries', which otherwise could not have purchased U.S.-made armaments. In 
this way, the Pentagon continued to support the Armament Core without any 
conspicuous increase in size of the domestic procurement budget. Ultimately, 
however, with the growing debt crisis that emerged after the 1970s, the U.S. 
government had to increasingly resort to military grants. Also a substantial 
portion of outstanding U.S. military loans to debt-plagued countries had to 
be 'forgiven' and turned into retroactive grants.6 Much of the appeal of 
arms exports was then lost since grant-financed foreign military sales 
required explicit budgeting and were subject to limitations that resembled 
those for domestic procurement. Subsequently, U.S. governmental finance had 
only a secondary role in the growth of arms exports. The primary element 
behind the expansion of this particular market was the global redistribution 
of income that stemmed from the oil crisis of the 1970s. 
After 1973, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East became the 
world's largest arms-importing countries, with their purchases largely 
financed from oil revenues. As we noted in Bichler, Nitzan and Rowley 
(1989), the interaction of petrodollars and arms sales has generally been 
explored from a macroeconomic perspective - -  the oil crisis redistributed 
income from the Industrialized West to OPEC countries, who in turn closed 
the international circular flow by purchasing industrial commodities, 
including arms, from western capitalist countries. The weakness of this 
perspective arises from its incompleteness. Rising oil prices and OPEC 
revenues did more than simply change the international trade balance. They 
also affected the power structure and institutions of western capitalist 
countries. 
The effects of changes in the oil industry were not evenly distributed 
within industrialized economies. Higher energy prices were transmitted 
through a complex structure of oligopolistic agencies rather than through 
the simple interaction of competitive supply and demand mechanisms. The 
consequence was a stagflationary process, which changed the previous 
structure of relative prices and had profound effects on the distribution of 
national income in general and of corporate profits in particular. In the 
United States, stagflation brought adversity to those corporations that 
concentrated their activities in civilian markets - -  since rising energy 
costs had to be partially absorbed while the corporations faced stagnation 
in mass consumption. On the other hand, some 'winners' emerged from the 
redistribution of corporate profits during the 1970s: (1) the major oil 
companies experienced substantial increases in their 'degree of monopoly' 
(as tentatively measured by the levels of their eventual mark-ups over 
costs); (2) the large banks absorbed most of the world's petrodollars, which 
they recirculated to oil-producing countries and energy-related projects ; 
and (3) members of the Armament Core, who were relatively unharmed by higher 
energy costs, experienced a boom in their petrodollar-financed military 
exports. 
The oil crisis created a potential for the emergence of an Armadollar- 
Petrodollar Coalition of major armament, energy and financial corporations, 
through which the traditional relationship that existed between arms 
producers and the U.S. government was enlarged. Furthermore, the governments 
of OPEC countries, especially those located in the Middle East, actively 
supplemented the role of the U.S. government in the arms business. A better 
understanding of the principal changes in the economic environment is gained 
if we briefly clarify the history of the involvement of the large oil 
companies in the Middle East. More details of this history are provided by 
Engler (1961, f977), Schwadran (1973), Blair (1976), and Turner (1980). Our 
account draws on the treatment by Barnet (1980). 
3. The Seven Sisters and Middle East Oil: From Access Rights 
to Pricing Might 
The present significance of the Middle East for the oil business can be 
simply explained. The area accounts for over half of the world's proven oil 
reserves and Middle Eastern oil is relatively cheap to extract. Not 
surprisingly, as these facts emerged, the region became an active 
battleground for control of its resources by the world largest oil 
companies, and especially by a group of corporations that came to be known 
as the 'Seven Sisters'; namely, Exxon, Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum, 
Texaco, Mobil, Chevron and Gulf. 
3.1 The 'Free Flow' Era 
In 1928, the world's three largest oil companies - -  Royal Dutch/Shell, 
Exxon (then Standard Oil of New Jersey) and British Petroleum (then Anglo 
Iranian-Oil Company) - -  arrived at the Achnacarry Agreement, which sought to 
preserve the status quo and to stabilize the control by these particular 
companies of world oil supplies. For about two decades, acceptance of this 
agreement permitted British Petroleum (and to a lesser extent, Royal 
Dutch/Shell and other European producers) to dominate oil supplies from the 
Middle East. The situation began to change by the late 1940s as British 
political influence waned and as European companies gradually lost some of 
their market share to intrusions by the large U.S.-based oil firms. In 1947, 
Exxon, Mobil , Texaco and Chevron (then Socal) formed ARAMCO, the Arabian- 
American Company which obtained preferential access to Saudi Arabian oil. 
Six years later, the CIA backed a successful coup against the government of 
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Prime Minister Mossaddeq, who attempted to nationalize Iranian oil, and 
consequently the monopoly of British Petroleum was lost. Iranian oil was 
officially nationalized but, in effect, control was effectively divided 
among the 5 American majors (whose new stake amounted to 40 per cent), Royal 
Dutch/Shell (14 per cent), the French CFS (6 per cent) and British Petroleum 
(40 per cent). 
Since the oil industry was first consolidated in the nineteenth 
century, no prolonged period of price competition has occurred. Despite a 
persistent concern with relative market shares, the principal oil companies 
have exhibited a remarkable degree of cooperation and, for much of their 
existence, they rarely permitted oil consumers to take advantage of any 
differences among producers. Nevertheless, in the long period prior to the 
emergence of OPEC, the Seven Sisters were unable to translate their joint 
cooperation into spectacular price increases, such as those that came to 
characterize the industry in the 1970s. The main key for higher profits was 
generally acknowledged to be one of access to cheap oil rather than the 
ability to increase unit mark-ups. Until the 1950s, the Tree flowe of 
Middle East oil was secured largely through private arrangements between the 
Seven Sisters and local rulers. Since production costs constituted only a 
minor fraction of the final price, even the most conspicuous demands of 
domestic kings were insignificant in comparison to access benefits that 
accrued to the oil companies. 
During the 1950s, this comfortable arrangement was undermined by three 
important developments, which challenged the dominant position then being 
enjoyed by the Seven Sisters in the Middle East 'and which eventually led to 
the formation of OPEC in 1960. First, 'independent' oil companies (such as 
the U. S. -based Getty Oil and Tidewater, the Italian state oil company ENI, 
and Japan Petroleum Trading Company) started to enter the Middle Eastern oil 
market and their activities raised the price of 'access' to oil resources. 
Royalty costs were dramatically increased and, eventually, reliance on the 
traditional royalty arrangements was replaced by involvement in joint 
ventures by the oil companies and local governments. Second, nationalist 
sentiments grew in the region. The strength of these sentiments signalled a 
major hazard to the position of the large oil companies. In 1956, the 
governments of Britain and France lost the joint military venture that they 
launched with Israeli support against Egypt, whose President Nasser closed 
the Suez canal. Another setback to the interests of the oil companies 
followed with the removal of Iraq's friendly ruler, Nuri as-Said. Third, the 
Seven Sisters lost some of their tight control of world oil output and, as 
production rapidly grew, oil prices began to drop. Oil companies were 
incapable of maintaining the price levels and the governments of oil- 
producing countries gained confidence in their own ability to affect market 
conditions. Adverse shifts in national oil revenues in the late 1950s 
provided the final incentive for these governments to act in concert and 
prepared the ground for the Baghdad Convention of 1960, at which OPEC was 
formed. During the 1960s, the newly formed OPEC cartel controlled about 80 
per cent of world output and it effectively succeeded in preventing further 
price declines. However, the realization of the full extent of OPEC's power 
was not evident prior to 1970, when Muammar Qaddaffi of Libya forced 
Occidental Petroleum, an 'independent' company, to cut output and raise 
prices. This event was a clear challenge to the supremacy of the oil 
companies although Occidental Petroleum, itself, stood to gain from the move 
by the Libyan ruler. Occidental Petroleum resisted but finally had to accept 
Qaddaffi's decree when Exxon declined to replace lost oil ~ u p p l i e s . ~  
3.2 Toward a 'Limited Flow' 
The formation of OPEC was generally perceived by the oil companies as a 
serious threat to their economic well-being. Nationalism and revolutions, 
they feared, would eventually lead to oil-producing countries attempting to 
take over the assets and activities of oil companies. However, the oil 
system was not revolutionized but rather it was simply reorganized. The oil 
companies could no longer rationalize the industry by themselves and a 
broader cooperation with governments was called for. Indeed, OPEC countries 
in the Middle East have been largely reluctant to take over the oil 
companies. The reasons for their hesitancy are not hard to grasp. The Seven 
Sisters control both the technology for production and the marketing system. 
In times of crisis, they could enjoy the American or European military 
support and also could expect this support to be extended to friendly OPEC 
governments. More importantly, OPEC govements in the Middle East depend on 
Western goodwill - -  for their oil revenues are economically meaningless 
without the investment and consumption outlets provided by the Western 
countries. A substantial OPEC challenge to the Seven Sisters could induce a 
serious world crisis, which might then lead to the demise of the OPEC 
governments themselves. 8 
The large oil companies did not seem to grasp the opportunities offered 
to them by attitudes within OPEC before the early 1970s. Certainly we have 
little evidence with which to confirm speculations that a 'conspiracy' 
existed between the companies and OPEC to initiate the oil crisis that 
occurred in 1973. Proposals to cut output by OPEC in 1972 were still 
resisted by the companies, who presumably were preoccupied with their 
concern over a loss of control. Ultimately, however, the new reality was 
accepted. In Figure 8, we indicate one explanation for this development. Our 
two lines permit a comparison of crude oil prices with the combined net 
profits earned by the 'Oil Six' from 1966 to 1986. This group of 
corporations includes members of the Seven Sisters with the exception of 
Gulf Oil, which was acquired by Chevron for $13 billion in 1984. (Our data 
are deflated by the U. S. deflator for GNP with 1982 as its base. ) The price 
of crude oil apparently had an important impact on the overall petroprofits 
of the Oil six since the two major oil crises of 1973 and 1979 led to 
dramatic increases in levels of profits, while subsequent price stability 
during the 1975-1978 period was associated with profit stability and price 
declines after 1981 led to drastic reductions in profits. 
The potential impact of crude oil prices on overall profits is far from 
trivial. As vertically integrated companies, the Oil Six are engaged in all 
stages of production - -  drilling, extracting, shipping, refining and the 
marketing of final petroleum products. Changes in crude oil prices should 
have a positive effect on profitability accruing from exploration and 
extraction but the changes may imply a negative impact on profits of 
downstream operations. The patterns exhibited in Figure 8 suggest that this 
PETRO-PRICES AND PETROPROFITS: 
CRUDE OIL PRICES AND THE NET PROFITS OF THE OIL  SIX^ 
($  billion, 1982 pricesb) 
Year 
SOURCE: Crude oil prices are from International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statf stics Yearbook (1986) , pp . 170-171 ; 
Net profits of the Oil Six are from Standard & Poor's Compustat 
Services (1986) Industrial Compustat, Compustat II/130-Item Annual 
Magnetic Tape (for 1966-1985) and 'The Fortune 500', Fortune, 
April 27, 1987 (for 1986-1987); For GNP deflator, see Figure 2. 
a The Oil Six corporations are British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, 
Royal Dutch/Shell and Texaco. 
Deflated by the GNP deflator with 1982 as base year. 
secondary negative impact of higher prices for crude oil was small. Further 
reflection provides a simple explanation. The price of crude oil forms the 
basis from which prices of subsequent petroleum products are determined. 
Traditionally, the oil companies have succeeded in stabilizing the unit 
markups over prime costs in their downstream operations. The absolute size 
of profits thus depends on the level of prime costs, which is determined by 
the prices of crude oil. During the late 1950s and 19609, the large oil 
companies were unsuccessful in their attempts to raise the price of crude 
oil and hence, with stable markups in downstream operations, their overall 
profits stagnated. The situation changed after 1973 when OPEC governments 
assumed the role of rationing production. These governments obviously sought 
to increase their own revenues but, as evident in Figure 8, the changes in 
oil prices that were brought about by their actions also had a profound 
effect on the Oil Six's petroprofits. 
Clearly, the year of 1973 can be identified with a qualitative change 
in the nature of the oil business. During the pre-1973 period, the key 
element to profits was viewed as the access to cheap crude oil but, since 
1973, the primary emphasis has shifted to price levels. Consequently, the 
rhetoric of support for activities of large oil companies begin to emphasize 
the notion of 'scarcity' for these firms no longer follow 'free flow' 
doctrines but rather pursue a 'limited flow' principle, according to which 
output is restricted to maintain higher prices. This cosmetic change in 
rhetorical focus reflects more than a mere 'technical' change in business 
strategy since the new 'limited flow' principle is associated with an 
important change in the power structure that prevails in the United States; 
namely, the emergence of an 'Annadollar-Petrodollar Coalition.' 
4. The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
During the existence of the 'free flow' regime before 1973, the large 
oil companies objected to the militarization of the Middle Eastern area. 
They feared the outburst of regional armed conflicts which would constrain 
the flow of oil and adversely affect their own operations. This perspective 
was diametrically opposed to the position generally maintained by member 
corporations of the Armament Core, who were increasingly active in Middle 
Eastern weapon markets in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The conflict of 
interest between major groups of U. S . corporations partially explains the 
traditional hostility between the U.S. State Department, which generally 
supported oil interests, and the Pentagon, which favoured the concerns of 
arms producers. However, once the 'free flow' regime was abandoned, the 
conflict between oil and arms interests lost much of its rationale. 
4.1 Armadollar-Petrodollar Cycles 
Table 3 and Figure 9 permit a better understanding of the post-1973 
reconciliation of competing interests. Their entries relate the overall oil 
revenues flowing into the Middle East and the arms revenues flowing out of 
that region since 1963. The figure reveals a 'step function' in this 
relationship. Between 1963 and 1973, both series exhibit an upward trend 
with annadollars growing faster than petrodollars - -  the ratio between the 
two series grew from 5 per cent in 1964 to 16 per cent in 1973. The 
'correction' of the oil crisis in 1973 significantly increased the flow of 
petrodollars and caused the armadollar-petrodollar ratio (which is recorded 
ARMADOLIARS AND PETRODOLLARS IN THE MIDDLE  EAST^ 
($  million) 
SOURCE: For arms imports, see Table 1; Oil export data are from United 
Nations, Department of International, Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistical Office, Sta t i s t i ca l  Yearbook (various years). 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
L 
a The Middle East includes Baharain, Cyprus, Democratic Yeman, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, Jordain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yeman. Oil export data exclude Egyptian 
shipments. 
Arms Imports 
to the 
Middle East 
378 
257 
285 
314 
556 
635 
820 
1,250 
1,175 
1,995 
3,745 
4,195 
3,950 
5,845 
7,960 
9,040 
9,725 
9,885 
14,600 
16,610 
17,340 
18,060 
9,390 
9 
Oil Export 
from the 
Middle East 
4,330 
5,100 
5,395 
6,030 
6,600 
7,290 
7,720 
8,942 
12,980 
15,093 
23,374 
84,582 
77,597 
93,169 
100,325 
93,233 
134,594 
196,784 
180,223 . 
130,980 
103,060 
91,509 
- - - -  
Arms Imports 
as Percent 
of Oil Export 
8.7 
5.0 
5.3 
5.2 
8.3 
8.7 
10.6 
14.0 
9.1 
13.2 
16.0 
5.0 
5.1 
6.3 
7.9 
10.3 
7.2 
5.0 
8.1 
12.7 
16.8 
19.7 
- - - -  
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ARMADOLLARS AND PETRODOLLARS: 
ARMS IMPORTS AND OIL EXPORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
($  billion) 
Armadollars 
\ Line representing 
5% ratio be- 
arms imports and 
o i l  exports 
Petrodollars 
SOURCE: See Tables 1 and 3. 
in the third column of Table 3) to fall back to an annual level of 5 per 
cent for this year. The oil crisis shifted the function but, for the period 
from 1974 to 1978, arms imports continue to rise at a rate somewhat faster 
than that for oil exports. As a result, the armadollar-petrodollar ratio 
climbed to 10.3 per cent in 1978. The second oil crisis in 1979 created 
another break and the armadollar-petrodollar ratio fell back to 5 per cent 
in 1980. Between 1981 and 1984, values of the ratio recovered but the 
constituent series moved in opposite directions with oil exports falling and 
arms imports rising. 
Before considering the changes that occurred in the early 1980s, we 
should provide a closer examination of earlier developments. Our data 
confirm the impression that the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 were followed by 
booms in arms exports. While many researchers identified these booms as 
directly due to changes in oil revenues, little attention was paid to the 
reverse influence of arms imports on oil-export revenues. We must note the 
three oil crises of 1967, 1973 and 1979 occurred after armed conflicts-- 
the 1967 mini-oil embargo came after an Israel-Arab war in that year; the 
1973 oil crisis was triggered by the war between Israel, Egypt and Syria; 
and the 1979 oil crisis coincided with the Iranian Revolution and the onset 
of the Iraq-Iran War. In Figure 10, we denote the years when these three 
armed conflicts broke out and describe the related development of armadollar 
values for military exports into the Middle East. As entries in the figure 
make clear, each of these armed conflicts, and especially the latter two 
conflicts, was preceded by several years in which arms imports rose rapidly. 
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ARMADOLLARS: ARMS IMPORTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST 
($  b i l l i o n )  
Yew 
SOURCE: S e e T a b l e s l a n d 3 .  
An acute sense of 'oil shortage' accompanied the dramatic increases for 
oil prices in 1973 and 1979. We suggest that the ability of the OPEC cartel 
to create this unpleasant atmosphere was significantly enhanced by the 
militarization of the region and the attendant outbursts of internecine 
armed conflicts. Thus the principal arms producers were not simply 'free 
riders' of the oil boom, late-comers who profited from the incidental 
increases in oil revenues accruing to Middle Eastern governments. Arms 
exports to the region were an active force that assisted both in the 
abolition of the 'free flow' regime and in its replacement by the new and 
more profitable 'limited flow' rationale for the oil industry. The 
interaction of arms imports and oil exports throughout the late 1960s and 
1970s followed an almost-stylized sequence, whereby an increasing level of 
arms imports facilitated the onset of armed conflict, which in turn 
stimulated the outbreak of an oil crisis. The 'scarcity' created by the 
crisis would then lead to an increased level of oil revenues, which were 
partially used to offset the costs of further increases in arms imports that 
could initiate a new 'cycle' of interaction.1° 
4.2 Armaprofits, Petroprofits and the Coalition 
The crucial question to be addressed here does not ask how the cyclical 
sequence affects oil and arms revenues but rather it concerns the sequence's 
bearing on a convergence of corporate profits. If we abstract from our 
concrete historical and institutional setting, levels of profitability in 
the oil and arms industries need have little in common - -  one industry 
produces a basic raw material and some related commodities, which are sold 
to many industrial and private consumers, while the other industry 
manufactures high-technology products that are almost exclusively purchased 
by governments. On the basis of the preceding analysis, however, such 
abstraction may be quite misleading. The combination of militarization and 
oil production in the Middle East might have had a similar impact on the 
profits of both arms and oil producers; thus creating a potential for an 
Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition between them. 
The purpose of Figure 11 is to present evidence on the apparent 
convergence of interests across the two industries. Entries outline the 
temporal development of the combined net profits earned by the Armament Nine 
and contrast this development with that of the combined net profits received 
by the Oil Six (both deflated by the U.S. deflator for GNP, with 1982 as its 
base). The cyclical patterns exhibited by the two series are remarkably 
similar. Both peaked together after oil/military crises - - in 1968, after 
the Six-Day War and the mini-embargo; in 1974, after the Yom-Kippur War and 
the first oil crisis; and in 1980, after the Iranian Revolution, the onset 
of the Iran-Iraq war and the second oil crisis. Petroprofits peaked again in 
1983 during the 'tanker-war' in the Persian Gulf, while armaprofits peaked a 
year later after the Israel-Lebanon War. A similar concurrence is also found 
in connection with troughs - -  while armaprofits reached their lowest level 
in 1970, two years before the trough for petroprofits, subsequent troughs in 
armaprofits and petroprofits simultaneously occurred in 1975, 1982 and 1986. 
We conclude these financial data support our contention that, during the 
1970s and early 1980s, the interests of large armament producers and oil 
ARMAPROFITS AND PETROPROFITS: 
NET PROFITS OF THE ARMAMENT NINE AND THE O I L  S I X  
($ b i l l i o n ,  1 9 8 2  pricesa) 
I k t  Pmfits of Amanent Nine a k t  Pmfits of Oil Six 
SOURCE: F o r  net p r o f i t s  o f  the Armament  N i n e  and O i l  S i x  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  see 
F i g u r e s  1 and 8 ;  F o r  GNP deflator ,  see F i g u r e  2 .  
a D e f l a t e d  by the GNP deflator w i t h  1 9 8 2  as base year. 
companies indeed converged to create a solid basis for the emergence of a 
potential coalition between the two groups. 
4.3 The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition and U.S. Foreinn Policy 
During the 1970s 
The implications of a coalition are complex. As a minimum, we are 
required to reassess some political events and to seek out the motivations 
and actions that surrounded these events. If we consider the first oil 
crisis, there is little evidence that either the large oil companies or 
armament companies were instrumental in 'engineering' the crisis but there 
are clear indications that the subsequent militarization and the second oil 
crisis were, at least partially, affected by the common interests of these 
firms. The role of the U.S. government as a mediator for the coalition also 
needs further exploration. For example, allegations have suggested that the 
administration of President Nixon supported Iran's attempt to raise oil 
prices. Both Nixon and Kissinger were promoting arms exports to the Shah's 
regime and they possibly considered higher revenues from oil sales as a 
primary source of funding for arms deliveries. l1 A n  alternative contention, 
expressed by Sampson (1981a), has Kissinger persuading the Shah to increase 
oil prices as a means of assisting Rockefeller since the Chase Manhattan 
Bank was experiencing awkward liquidity difficulties that could be somewhat 
eased by further deposits of petrodollars. The earlier support of military 
sales to Israel by Nixon and his dismissal of the warning from Saudi Arabia 
that such support could lead to an oil embargo are not inconsistent with 
speculations that the U.S. government mediated the wishes of an emerging 
coalition of arms and oil interests. 
Such speculations are stimulated by the apparent political ties of 
government figures and industry representatives. Nixon, for example, was 
closely associated with the oil industry, which provided financial 
assistance to advance his political career and facilitate his election 
campaigns, as described by Barnet (1980, pp. 23-4). Representatives of some 
Rockefeller corporations were especially active in the .network of activists 
that developed around this career. They include Volcker, Letty and Fiero who 
accepted key posts in the Nixon administration.12 With respect to the arms 
industry, Nixon was subjected to mounting pressures from members of the 
Armament Core during his years in office, when the corporations were 
adversely affected by declines in their Pentagon orders after 1968. Clearly, 
we cannot definitively show that the Nixon Administration promoted increases 
in oil prices as a pragmatic response to serve the dual interests of 
armament and oil companies. The administrationPs policies, however, were 
f avourable to these interests when they permitted the ' era of arms exports ' 
and intensified the militarization of the Middle East. 
A more substantial boost for the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition was 
provided by Nixon's presidential successors. During the Carter 
Administration, which was in office from 1977 to 1981, the domestic military 
budget again began to rise after a long period of decline. In those years 
the United States also emerged as the leading arms-exporting country. 
Although Carter expressed concern for the 'free flow' of oil, his policies 
reinforced the tendencies that led to the next oil crisis. Paradoxically, 
while often perceived as a peace-maker who promoted conciliation in the 
region, Carter was the President of the United States who made the most 
contribution to the opening of the Middle East to arms producers. In 1978, 
he initiated the first 'combination deal' whereby U.S. armament producers 
simultaneously equipped several warring factions - -  a pattern which was 
promptly institutionalized by other arms-exporting countries as a means of 
promoting peace through arms sales ! l3 Carter's strategy of ' stabilization' 
also allowed the United States to continue arming Iran when the Shah's 
regime faced both domestic and external challenges. 
The United States was not the only foreign power active in the Middle 
East since actions by the Soviet Union and European countries also 
reinforced the trend toward militarization. l4 However, without question, the 
United States was still the primary actor here. After the 1973 oil crisis, 
U. S . government administrations must have been aware that in building the 
military arsenals of various Middle East countries they could destabilize 
the region and endanger the 'free flow' of oil. In the light of such 
awareness, the involvement of the Carter Administration at the outset of the 
1979 oil crisis is disturbing. Despite the delicate political situation that 
prevailed in Iran, Carter quickly granted asylum to the Shah after he was 
ousted and thus triggered the hostage crisis. When Iran threaten to withdraw 
its deposits from the vaults of banks in the United States, the president 
retaliated by seizing Iranian assets. Such reactions feed allegations that 
the president was unduly influenced by his special relationship with the 
Rockefeller group, who again feared the losses of their extensive loans to 
Iran. 15 
4.4 The Coalition and the Reapan Administration 
The power of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition reached its apex 
during the early 1980s. President Reagan nominated Haig, a director of Chase 
Manhattan and the president and chief operating officer of the large 
armament firm United Technologies, as his Secretary of State. Haig had 
previously served as President Nixon's Deputy .Assistant for National 
Security Affairs and as the White House Chief of Staff. United Technologies 
exports helicopters and aircraft engines to the Middle East. Shiff and Yaari 
(1984) allege that, in his capacity as Secretary of State, Haig gave Israel 
the 'green light' to launch the 1982 Lebanon War. He was also able to 
persuade the Israeli government to install engines from United Technologies 
in its proposed Lavi aircraft - -  although the I.D.F. preferred the 
alternative engines that General Electric could offer - -  and may have 
assisted United Technologies to sell helicopters to both Taiwan and the 
Philippines. (Following his resignation from public office in 1982, Haig 
became a consultant to the company.) Reagan also nominated Regan, a partner 
and chairman of Merrill Lynch, as his Treasury Secretary. Merrill Lynch is 
the largest brokerage house in the United States and, like both Chase 
Manhattan and United Technologies, has a special connection with the Middle 
East. In 1978, Merrill Lynch had acquired White Weld, an international 
investment firm that advised the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) on how 
the $100 billion portfolio of the agency should be recycled and guided the 
investment of a daily inflow of about 450 million petrodollars. As his 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Regan nominated Mulford, who 
until then had managed White Weld's operations in Saudi Arabia. Other 
interesting appointments during the Reagan Administration that were 
associated with oil interests include the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve 
Board, Volcker and Greenspan - -  one was linked to the Rockefeller group and 
the other was a director of both Mobil Oil and J.P. Morgan prior to their 
appointments. 
The most important representatives of the Armadollar-Petrodollar 
Coalition that found their way into the Reagan Administration were several 
veterans of the privately-owned company Bechtel, the world's largest 
construction and engineering concern.16 As his initial Defense Secretary, 
Reagan chose Weinberger, a Bechtel vice-president; and in 1982, the 
president asked Shultz, Bechtel's president and formerly the Labor Secretary 
and Treasury Secretary of President Nixon, to become Secretary of State 
instead of Haig. Other Bechtel veterans with key positions were Casey (the 
CIA Director), Allen (National Security Advisor), Davis (Deputy Secretary of 
Energy) and Habib (Special Envoy to the Middle East). As the world's largest 
constructor of military installations and energy-related projects, Bechtel 
is the ideal embodiment of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition. The full 
political leverage of the company has only emerged since the mid-1970s 
although its influence can be discerned from the Second World War. 
When Shultz joined Bechtel in 1974, the company's business was still 
domestically oriented in the main but by 1982, when he left the company, 
about 50 per cent of its business was conducted outside the United States. 
Much of this transition in geographical focus could have been attributed to 
the oil crises. Bechtel became active in the Middle East, where its efforts 
included the construction of natural gas projects in Algeria and Abu Dhabi, 
power stations in Cairo and refineries, airports and petrochemical cities in 
Saudi Arabia. Many of the company's other energy-related projects were 
launched as a result of the new environment of crisis. l7 Petrodollar 
revenues also enabled Bechtel to take part in the militarization of the 
Middle East by building air fields and military installations. Estimates of 
the company's annual sales during the early 1980s exceed $15 billion and its 
outstanding contract obligations might surpass $60 billion. With so much at 
stake, it is hardly surprising that the company should be speculatively 
implicated in many Middle East scandals - -  for example, in the Syrian coup 
of 1949, when the Syrian government raised obstacles to the construction of 
a Saudi-Syrian pipeline; the Iranian coup of 1953, when the Iranian 
government wanted to ship oil to the Soviet Union; the $200 million bribe to 
Saudi Arabian officials in return for a $3.4 billion contract to build a new 
airport in Riyadh; and the attempt to bribe Israeli Prime Minister Peres so 
that he would not to attack the proposed Iraqi-Jordanian pipeline that could 
cost $1.5 billion to construct.18 
All of this speculative activity, and the underlying reality that it 
reflects, suggests that the positive relationship between armaprofits and 
petroprofits, as charted in Figure 11, is not a statistical artifact. We are 
left with the overwhelming impression that somewhere lurking behind the 
financial flows, there must be significant individuals who represent the 
large arms, oil and financial companies and who are jointly involved in 
determining the primary thrust of U.S. policies for the Middle Eastern 
region. 
The links between armament and oil corporations have also been 
reflected in a network of interlocking directorships. For example, during 
the 1980s, the chairman and chief executive officer of Standard Oil of 
Indiana (Swearingen) was a director of both Chase Manhattan and Lockheed; 
the board of directors of McDonnell Douglas include a director of Phillips 
Petroleum (Chetkovich) and a director of Shell Canada (MacDonald); the 
chairman and president of United Technologies (Gray) was a director of both 
Exxon and Citibank; Boeing shared one director with Mobil and three 
directors with Chevron, including the chairman of Chevron (Keller); and the 
Chevron board included a director from Allied Signal (Hills) and the 
president and chief executive of Hewlett Packard (Yound) .19 Such interlocks 
facilitate a sharing of common interests and they serve as an informal 
mechanism for the transmission of views that permit strategic actions to be 
coordinated. The extensive network has a potential role in the mediation of 
cooperative efforts. 
The emergence of cooperation brought a partial convergence of political 
pressures. Due to their dependency on the persistence of high levels of 
government spending, the armament companies traditionally sought to promote 
'Keynesian'-type policies, which include various forms of intervention by 
the U.S. federal government in economic activities. The oil companies, on 
the other hand, have generally encouraged the adopt ion of ' monetarist ' 
policies and low budgetary deficits that were consistent with a small tax 
burden on their own profitability. Thus the consolidation of the Armadollar- 
Petrodollar Coalition meant that some conciliatory changes in political 
rhetoric were necessary. In particular, the vigour of the oil industry's 
resistance to large military budgets had to weaken. The consequences were of 
immense significance. During earlier decades, civilian business interests 
served to provide a countervailing force against any military buildup-- 
thus providing the basis for a competitive struggle between rival business 
factions in the economic and political elite of the United States, as 
described by Kalecki (1967) and briefly considered by us in Bichler, Nitzan 
and Rowley (1989) . This situation changed during the 1970s and early 1980s 
because the largest civilian business groups, essentially the oil companies, 
began to support the predatory demands of the Armament Core. 20 The 
concurrence of support is, we suggest, a crucial ingredient in any 
reasonable explanation of the ambient conditions from which it was possible 
to launch the largest peace-time buildup of defence expenditures in 
history.21 The basis for the arms-oil alliance, however, was inherently 
unstable for its continuation must ultimately hinge on the maintenance of 
high levels for oil prices. Thus the oil companies would consent to the 
'military Keynesianism' of President Reagan's Administration on the home 
front provided their own situation was enhanced by the pursuit of a 
militarization policy in the Middle East, which assisted them by raising oil 
prices. When the price of crude oil began to decline in the early 1980s, the 
uneasy foundations of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition were shaken. 
The pivotal significance of high oil prices was abruptly uncovered in 
1986, when Saudi Arabia flooded the oil market with additional supplies and 
caused the price of crude petroleum to drop below $10 per barrel. This 
action was recognized as so hazardous to the interests of the Armadollar- 
Petrodollar Coalition that some immediate political response was called for. 
Subsequently, the vice president was sent to the Middle East with the task 
of openly asking Saudi Arabia to reconsider the action and reinstate lower 
levels for production. Bush insisted that the government of the United 
States was 'fundamentally, irrevocably committed' to maintaining the free 
flow of oil and 'the interest in the United States is bound to be cheap 
energy prices'. However, the vice president also qualified this message: 
[There] is some point at which the national security interests of 
the United States say, 'Hey, we must have a strong, viable 
domestic interest.' We recognize that as we talk about national 
interests that comes in conflict at some point - -  and I don't know 
where that is - -  with the totally free market concept that we 
basically favor in our economic approach to all i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~ ~  
To substantiate this sacrifice of the 'free market concept', President 
Reagan ordered a study to examine the impact of falling energy prices on 
'national security'. This study, which was eventually completed and then 
classified as 'top secret', was never published. Regardless of its findings, 
any attempt to restrict the decline of oil prices must sacrifice the 
benefits to be anticipated by many American consumers and producers from 
lower prices in order to stabilize the economic benefits accruing to members 
of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition. While the outcome of this 
particular incident seems to show the strength of the coalition' s leverage 
over the U. S. foreign policy, the eventual failure to keep high oil prices 
indicated the power of such leverage were limited. During the 1980s, 
important global changes revealed the inherent fragility of the coalition 
and caused its structure to be transformed. 
Appendix: Price and Quantity Indices for Military Spendine, 
In the United States, the Bureau of Economic Analysis adopts 
'specification pricing', where each constituent commodity is defined by a 
set of physical characteristics - -  rather than 'functional pricing', where 
the corresponding definition uses attributes that serve a particular purpose 
regardless of physical characteristics. The choice of the first procedure 
was partially affected by a desire to avoid the issue of 'quality change' 
which arose with the second method. In 'functional pricing', commodities 
that change and no longer fit the specifications are simply removed from the 
price index. 
Unfortunately, this method resolves the problem only by ignoring it. In 
the case of military production, the output undergoes rapid and often 
drastic changes in its nature. New aircraft, missiles, tanks, ammunition, 
cannons and submarines are continuously introduced, while the 
characteristics of existing ones are ceaselessly amended. Under such dynamic 
conditions, a strict adherence to 'specification pricing' would require the 
eventual removal of most military commodities from the price index and the 
ultimate elimination of the index itself! The fact that price and quantity 
indices for military output are provided on a regular basis means that some 
'functional pricing' methods are implicitly embedded in the 'specification 
pricing' procedure in order to help statisticians compare the changing 
quality of different military commodities in different period of times. But 
then changes in the ' quality' of weapon- sys tems must be evaluated in light 
of contributions to their particular purpose, namely, to the promotion of 
'national security'. 
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis does not conduct such complex 
evaluations and instead relies on an arbitrary procedure to overcome the 
difficulty. To estimate quality changes, the agency requires a change in 
specifications that entails additional production costs. [See the 
instructive account by Zimmer and Galbraith (1983) . ] Thus, for example, if 
General Dynamics amends the design specifications for the SSN-688 submarine 
and seeks a unit increase of some 20 per cent for both capital and labour 
outlays, then this event is recorded as an improvement in 'quality' of 20 
per cent. Whether the amendment improves or reduces the potential 
performance of the submarine has no direct bearing on this calculation. In 
civilian markets, effective competition can mean that costly changes will 
occur only if the market accepts them. However, military markets often lack 
a similar degree of market discipline so reliance on cost information is an 
unreliable basis for the calculation of measurement proxies to represent 
quality. There is an environment here that permits contractors, not bound by 
fixed-price terms, to increase their profits by raising 'declared' costs. 
Numerous scandals have generated sufficient evidence to show that the 
linkage of cost increases with quality adjustments is somewhat tenuous. See 
'Cracking Down on Contractors' in Time (April 8, 1985). The unsatisfactory 
explanation of BEA's methods for dealing with transformations from old to 
new weapon systems is also disconcerting for the reliability of 
measurements. Again, see Zimmer and Galbraith (1983) for a fuller comment. 
1. The overall decline is revealed by a number of different indices. For 
example, the annual levels of contract awards and gross obligations of the 
U.S. Department of Defense move together and both reveal the same pattern of 
decline. Since the pricing of military products has some idiosyncratic 
features, the choice of deflators to obtain ' constant-dollar ' aggregates is 
quite troublesome. Our examination focuses on corporate revenues from 
military production and because such earnings are reinvested in a wide 
variety of alternative uses, we chose to deflate nominal figures for defence 
spending by the GNP deflator rather than use the implicit deflator for 
military expenditures. The appendix contains a brief comment on the nature 
and measurement of prices and quantities in this context. 
2. Data for awards of prime contracts by the U.S. Department of Defense do 
not provide information on actual payments. We rely on values for contract 
awards and obligations (with a reasonable assumption of short payment lags) 
to support the inference that the share of military revenues from U.S. 
sources declined for the corporations as a proportion of their overall sales 
revenues. 
3. The ACDA also notes its statistics are 'estimates of goods actually 
delivered during the reference year, in contrast both to the value of 
programs, agreements, contracts or orders which may result in future 
deliveries, and to payments made during the period.' The data exclude the 
value of arms that are obtained by subnational groups and are thus 
predicated on direct transfers to national governments. 
4. Adams (1982, p. 311) cites an internal 1975 report from the Lockheed 
corporation, for example, to the effect that its 'foreign military sales 
generally are more profitable than its domestic sales and generally provide 
favorable advances which have been a significant factor in Lockheed's total 
financing program.' 
5. We briefly touch on the concept of 'institutional waste' in Bichler, 
Nitzan and Rowley (1989). 
6. See for instance, 'Arms Sales Turn Into Gifts For Struggling Third 
World Nations' in Business Week (July 25, 1983). 
7. See Turner (1980), pp. 139-40. 
8. This view, for example ,. was openly expressed by Saudi Arabia. Barnet 
(1980, p. 61) cites a comment in 1969 by the Saudi petroleum minister, 
Yamani, on the strategy to develop an orderly alliance of market 
participants: 'For our part, we do not want the majors to lose their power 
and be forced to abandon their role as a buffer element between the 
producers and the consumers. We want the present setup to continue as long 
as possible and at all costs to avoid any disastrous clash of interests 
which would shake the foundations of the whole oil industry.' 
9. The oil companies, of course, favoured the use of military force to 
promote their own concerns - -  such as, for example, occurred in the Iranian 
coup of 1953 and the Egyptian episode of 1956. But the companies saw no need 
to arm oil-producing countries and they objected to U.S. military aid for 
Israel. In 1973, for instance, the ARAMCO partners disagreed with President 
Nixon's actions in providing military support to Israel. The partners even 
contributed to the funds of Arab organizations and refused to supply 
petroleum to the Sixth Fleet during the oil embargo of that year. 
10. This use of a causal chain to explicate the emergence of new features 
in the political economy of armaments is a teleological device, the validity 
of which cannot be meaningfully assessed by a confrontation with 
conventional tests of statistical significance for hypotheses. No formal 
system of testing offers much assistance in verifying counterfactual issues 
such as whether the oil industry might have evolved in a different way if 
the arms sales has not occurred. Our tentative hypotheses should be judged 
by their internal consistency and by their usefulness in the presentation 
and interpretation of apposite 'facts'. Berlin (1969) and Carr (1961) 
illustrate different attitudes to historical explanation. 
11. Allegations in this context were put forward on the program Sixty 
Minutes of the CBS network for May 3, 1980. Kissinger declined to reply to 
the allegations. See Chan (1980), p. 244, footnote 1. 
12. Volcker was Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Letty 
was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and Fiero was Director of the 
Office of Foreign Direct Investment in the Commerce Department. For more 
information, see Barnet and Muller (1974, p. 251) and Turner (1980, p. 105). 
13. The first 'combination deal' followed the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, 
when President Carter agreed to compensate Israel for its withdrawal from 
the Sinai Peninsula. He permitted U.S. companies, primarily Bechtel, to 
construct two new air fields in the Negev desert at a cost of $2.2 billion 
and granted a 'reorganization' of armaments worth $1.8 billion. Carter also 
agreed to sell Egypt arms worth $400 million, while Saudi Arabia would 
receive weapons worth $2.5 billion. As reported in Ha'aretz (April 3, 1983), 
Vance, who was Carter's Secretary of State and actively participated in the 
negotiations, explained the deal by noting that Egypt needed security in 
order to pursue the peace negotiations with Israel and that Saudi Arabia 
sought the arms to enhance regional stability. (The significance of the deal 
for the Armament Core was not explored in this explanation. In 1987 Vance 
was nominated as director of General Dynamics, a company that was one of the 
main beneficiaries of the agreement.) 
14. By the mid-1970s, European companies were already supplying over 15 per 
cent of the region's arms imports. European-based oil companies, 
particularly Royal Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum, stood to gain from the 
outcome of another oil crisis. 
15. The process which led to the seizure of Iranian assets is explained in 
Sampson (1981a; 1981b, ch. 17). During the period from 1976 to 1978, Iran 
borrowed $3.8 billion to finance arms purchases. On the eve of the Iranian 
Revolution, an outstanding debt of $500 million was owed to a consortium 
headed by Chase Manhattan but Iranian deposits of $433 million were also 
held by the bank. However, Chase Manhattan had no legal authority to hold 
onto the fund and the money was eventually seized only after the hostage- 
crisis induced the United States government to freeze Iranian assets. 
Rockefeller was not passive in the onset of this crisis. Sampson reveals how 
Kissinger, a special advisor to Chase Manhattan at the time, and McCloy, a 
former chairman of the bank, were influential in the decision to grant 
asylum to the Shah despite the fragile political atmosphere. In the turmoil 
that followed, the government in Teheran threaten to withdraw its deposits 
from U.S. banks and President Carter froze them, arguing that this was 
necessary in order to prevent destabilization of the banking system. But 
this official reasoning was unfounded since only about $8 billion dollars of 
Iranian assets were on deposit within the U.S. banking system - - markedly 
insufficient to destabilize the system. Moreover, most Iranian deposits were 
held in London. But while the American economy as a whole was in no real 
danger, some individual banks, notably Chase Manhattan and Citibank of the 
Rockefeller group, were vulnerable. 
16. The Bechtel family owns 41 per cent of the company's shares while 
ownership of the remainder is spread among senior managers. The company 
could not be included in our statistical analyses because of its private 
ownership, which effectively precludes collection of appropriate data. See 
Golan (1982) for a brief comment on Bechtel. 
17. These projects included hydroelectric dams (such as the James Bay 
Project in Northern Quebec), oil pipelines (the link from Alaska to the main 
body of the United States), and nuclear reactor plants in the United States 
and elsewhere. Ha'aretz (December 13, 1984) suggests that Shultz insisted 
Israel 'could not afford' a new reactor when the Israeli government decided 
to-purchase a French-made option rather than one constructed by Bechtel. The 
deal struck with French interests was cancelled. 
18. See Levine (1988), p. 16. Other speculative views have suggested 
scandalous behaviour in the 'fixing' of Bechtel's contract for the James Bay 
Project and in the bribing of Korean officials to win contracts for nuclear 
power plants. See Grieves (1984). 
19. Such information can be readily obtained from Moody's Industrial 
Manual, which is published annually. See also the account by Adams (1982). 
20. Many large civilian producers directly entered into the production of 
armaments, a development which added to the political leverage that could be 
exercised by the Armament Core. For a fuller account, see Nitzan, Rowley and 
Bichler (1989). 
21. As a conservative politician, President Reagan promised to eradicate 
the budgetary deficit but, during his years in office, this deficit rapidly 
rose to unprecedented levels. Driven by pressures from the Armadollar- 
Petrodollar coalition, the president moved to introduce corporate tax cuts 
and enlarged military expenditures. 
22. 'Bush Sees Threat to Security of U.S. in the Oil Price Slide' in The 
New York Times for April 7, 1986 (pp. Al, D12). 
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